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Abstract
The favorite-longshot bias presents a challenge for theories of decision making under
uncertainty. This longstanding empirical regularity is that betting odds provide biased
estimates of the probability of a horse winning—longshots are overbet, while favorites
are underbet. Neoclassical explanations focus on rational gamblers who overbet long-
shots due to risk-love. The competing behavioral explanations emphasize the role of
misperceptions of probabilities. We provide novel empirical tests that can discriminate
between these competing theories by focusing on the pricing of compound bets. We test
whether the models that explain gamblers’ choices in one part of their choice set (bet-
ting to win) can also rationalize decisions over a wider choice set, including compound
bets in the exacta, quinella or trifecta pools. Using a new, large-scale dataset ideally
suited to implement these tests we find evidence in favor of the view that mispercep-
tions of probability drive the favorite-longshot bias, as suggested by Prospect Theory.
Along the way we provide more robust evidence on the favorite-longshot bias, falsifying
the conventional wisdom that the bias is large enough to yield profit opportunities (it
isn’t) and that it becomes more severe in the last race (it doesn’t).
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1 Introduction
The racetrack provides a natural laboratory for economists interested in understanding
decision-making under uncertainty. The most discussed empirical regularity in gambling
is the favorite-longshot bias. That is, equilibrium market prices (betting odds) are biased
estimates of the probability of a horse winning. Specifically, bettors value longshots more
than expected given how rarely they win, and they value favorites too little given how often
they actually win. Quantitatively, as shown in Figure 1, the rate of return to betting on
horses with odds of 100/1 or greater is about −61%, betting randomly yields average returns
of −23%, while betting the favorite in every race yields losses of only around 5.5%.
Since the favorite-longshot bias was first noted by Griffith in 1949, it has been found
in racetrack betting data around the world, with very few exceptions. The literature docu-
menting this bias is voluminous, and covers both bookmaker- and pari-mutuel markets.1
Two broad sets of theories have been proposed to explain the favorite-longshot bias.
First, neoclassical theory suggests that the prices that bettors are willing to pay for various
gambles can be used to recover their utility function. While betting at any odds is actuarially
unfair, this is particularly acute for longshots—which are also the riskiest investments. Thus,
the neoclassical approach can reconcile both gambling and the longshot bias only by positing
(at least locally) risk-loving utility functions, as in Friedman and Savage (1948).
Alternatively, behavioral theories suggest that cognitive errors and misperceptions of
probabilities play a role in market mis-pricing. These theories incorporate laboratory stud-
ies by cognitive psychologists that show that people are systematically poor at discerning
between small and tiny probabilities, and hence price both similarly. Further, people exhibit
a strong preference for certainty over extremely likely outcomes, leading highly probable gam-
bles to be under-priced. These results form an important foundation of Prospect Theory
1Thaler and Ziemba (1988), Sauer (1998) and Snowberg and Wolfers (2007) survey the literature. The
exception to the favorite-longshot bias is found in Busche and Hall (1988) which finds that the favorite-
longshot bias is not evident in data on 2,653 Hong Kong races; Busche (1994) confirms this finding on a
further 2690 races in Hong Kong, and 1738 races in Japan.
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which can rationalize the purchase of sometimes extremely
unfavorable lottery tickets, and violations of expected utility theory such as the Allais (1953,
1979) Paradox.
Our aim in this paper is to test whether a risk-love model or misperceptions model best
fits the data. While there exist many specific models of the favorite-longshot bias, we show in
Section 3 that each yields implications for the pricing of gambles equivalent to stark models
of either a risk-loving representative agent, or a representative agent who bases her decisions
on biased perceptions of true probabilities. Thus, the risk-love versus misperceptions dis-
tinction is a taxonomy for two sets of theories, rather than a sharp dividing line between
two competing theories. More formally, we ask whether the favorite-longshot bias reflects a
non-linear response to the potential proceeds of a winning wager, or a non-linear response
to the probability of winning that wager.2
We combine new data with a novel econometric identification strategy to discriminate
between these two classes of theories. Our data include all 6.4 million horse race starts in
the United States from 1992 to 2001. These data are an order of magnitude larger than
any dataset previously examined, and allow us to be extremely precise in establishing the
relevant stylized facts. Our econometric strategy relies on compound gambles to distinguish
between theories based on risk-love or misperceptions.
Previous authors have only used data on win bets, but these cannot separate the two
theories without imposing arbitrary functional form assumptions on preferences or types of
misperceptions. That is, the favorite-longshot bias in win bets can be fully rationalized by a
standard rational-expectations expected-utility model, with lower rates of return to betting
on favorites due to the shape of the utility function. Equally, the bias can be fully explained
by appealing to an expected wealth maximizing agent who overweights small probabilities
and underweights large probabilities. Thus, without parametric assumptions (which we are
2Or adopting a behavioral versus neoclassical distinction, we follow Gabriel and Marsden (1990) in asking:
“are we observing an inefficient market or simply one in which the tastes and preferences of the market
participations lead to the observed results?”
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unwilling to make), the two theories are observationally equivalent in win bet data.
Our innovation is to differentiate these theories by deriving testable predictions about
compound lotteries (called exotic bets at the racetrack). For example, an exacta is a bet on
both which horse will come first and which will come second. Essentially, we ask whether the
preferences and perceptions that rationalize the favorite-longshot bias (in win bet data) can
also explain the pricing of exactas, quinellas—a bet on two horses to come first and second
in either order—and trifectas—a bet on three horses to come in first, second and third in
order. By expanding the choice set under consideration (to correspond with the bettor’s
actual choice set!), we use each theory to derive unique testable predictions.
To demonstrate the application of this idea to our data, note that betting on horses with
odds between 3/1 and 10/1 has an approximately constant rate of return (at −18%, see
Figure 1). Thus, under the misperceptions model we infer bettors are equally well calibrated
over this range, and hence betting on combinations of outcomes among such horses will yield
similar rates of return. That is, betting on an exacta with a 3/1 horse to win and a 10/1
horse to come second will yield similar expected returns to betting on the exacta with the
reverse ordering (although the odds of the two exactas will differ). In contrast, under the
risk-love model bettors have different preferences over betting at different odds, and hence
the expected returns to these alternative exactas will differ. To see this, note that the more
likely exacta (3/1 then 10/1) is about a 30/1 chance, while the reverse ordering exacta is
about a 40/1 chance. As the risk-loving bettor prefers the opportunity to win big, she will
be willing to accept a larger risk penalty (or negative risk premium) for betting on the less
likely exacta, decreasing its rate of return in equilibrium.
Our research question is most similar to Jullien and Salanie´ (2000) and Gandhi (2007) who
differentiate between preference- and perception-based explanations of the favorite-longshot
bias using only win bet data. The results of the former favor perception-based explanations
and the results of the later favor preference-based explanations. Rosett (1965) conducts a
related analysis in that he considers both win bets and combinations of win bets as present
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in the bettors’ choice set. Ali (1979) and Asch and Quandt (1987) test the efficiency of
compound lottery markets. We believe that we are the first to use these prices to distinguish
between competing theories of possible market (in)efficiency. Of course the idea is much
older: Friedman and Savage (1948) notes that a hallmark of expected utility theory is “that
the reaction of persons to complicated gambles can be inferred from their reaction to simple
gambles.”
2 Stylized Facts
Our data contains all 6,403,712 horse starts run in the United States between 1992 and
2001. These data are official jockey club data; the most precise data available. Data of this
nature are extremely expensive, which presumably explains why previous studies have used
substantially smaller samples. Appendix A provides more detail about the data.
We summarize our data in Figure 1. We calculate the rate of return to betting on every
horse at each odds, and use Lowess smoothing to take advantage of information from horses
with similar odds. Data are graphed on a log-odds scale so as to better show their relevant
range. Figure 1 shows the rate of return to betting on horses in each category. The average
rate of return for betting favorites is about −5.5%, while for horses at a mid-range of 3/1
to 15/1 yield a rate of return of −18%, and real longshots—horses at 100/1 or more—yield
much lower returns of −61%. This is the favorite-longshot bias. Figure 1 also shows the
same pattern for the 206,808 races (with 1,485,112 horse starts) for which the jockey club
recorded payoffs to exacta, quinella or trifecta bets. Given that much of our analysis will
focus on this smaller sample, it is reassuring to see a similar pattern of returns.
Figure 2 shows the same rate of return calculations for several other datasets. We present
new data from 2,725,000 starts in Australia from the South Coast Database, and 380,000
starts in Great Britain from flatstats.co.uk. The favorite-longshot bias appears equally evi-
dent in these countries, despite the fact that odds are determined by a bookmaker-dominated
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market in the United Kingdom, and bookmakers competing with a state-run pari-mutuel
market in Australia. Figure 2 also includes historical estimates of the favorite-longshot bias,
showing that it has been stable since it was first noted in Griffith (1949).
The literature suggests two other empirical regularities that we can explore. First, Thaler
and Ziemba (1988) suggest that there are positive rates of return to betting extreme favorites,
perhaps suggesting limits to arbitrage. This is not true in any of our datasets, providing a
similar finding to Levitt (2004): despite significant anomalies in the pricing of bets, there
are no profit opportunities from simple betting strategies.
Second, McGlothlin (1956), Ali (1977) and Asch, Malkiel and Quandt (1982) argue that
the rate of return to betting moderate longshots falls in the last race of the day. These
studies have come to be widely cited despite being based on small samples. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) and Thaler and Ziemba (1988) interpret these results as consistent with loss
aversion: most bettors are losing at the end of the day, and the last race provides them
with a chance to recoup their losses. Thus, bettors underbet the favorite even more than
usual, and overbet horses at odds that would eliminate their losses. The dashed line in
Figure 1 separates out data from the last race; while the point estimates differ slightly, these
differences are not statistically significantly. If there was evidence of loss aversion in earlier
data, it is no longer evident in recent data, even as the favorite-longshot bias has persisted.
As such, we propose that a satisfactory theory must be compatible with the following
robust stylized facts:
• Rates of return to betting fall as the odds rise. Returns are slightly negative on
extreme favorites, moderately negative on mid-range horses and extremely negative on
longshots;
• The bias has been persistent for fifty years; and
• The bias occurs across bookmaker, pari-mutuel and combination markets.
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In Section 3 we argue that these three facts are not sufficient to separate risk-love from
misperception-based theories. We propose a fourth test: a theory developed to explain
equilibrium odds of horses winning should also be able to explain the equilibrium odds in
the exacta, quinella and trifecta markets.
3 Two Models of the Favorite-Longshot Bias
We start with two extremely stark models, each of which has the merit of simplicity. Both
are models where all agents have the same preferences and perceptions, but as we suggest
below, can be usefully expanded to incorporate heterogeneity. Aggregate price data cannot
separately identify more complex models from these representative agent models.
3.1 The Risk-Love Model
Following Weitzman (1965), we postulate expected utility maximizers with unbiased beliefs
and utility U(·): R → R. In equilibrium, bettors must be indifferent between betting on
the favorite horse A at odds of OA/1 and a probability of winning of pA, and betting on a
longshot B at odds of OB/1 with probability of winning pB:
pAU(OA) = pBU(OB) (normalizing utility to zero, if the bet is lost).
3 (1)
Given that we observe the odds (OA, OB) and the probabilities (pA, pB) of horses at each
odds winning, these data identify the representative bettor’s utility function up to a scaling
factor.4 To fix a scaling we normalize utility to zero if the bet loses, and to one if the bettor
chooses not to bet. Thus, if the bettor is indifferent between accepting or rejecting a gamble
that wins with probability p, offering odds of O/1, then U(O) =
1
p
. The left panel of Figure
3 performs precisely this analysis, backing out the utility function required to fully explain
3We also assume that each bettor chooses to bet on only one horse in a race.
4See Weitzman (1965), Ali (1977), Quandt (1986) and Jullien and Salanie´ (2000) for prior examples.
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all of the variation in Figure 1.
As can be seen from Figure 3, a risk-loving utility function is required to rationalize the
bettor accepting lower average returns on longshots, even as they are riskier bets. Figure 3
also shows that a CARA utility function fits the data reasonably well.
Several other theories of the favorite-longshot bias yield implications that are observa-
tionally equivalent to a risk-loving representative agent model. Some of these theories are
clearly equivalent—such as Golec and Tamarkin (1998), which argues that bettors prefer
skew rather than risk—as they are theories about the shape of the utility function. Other
theories require more discussion. For instance, Thaler and Ziemba (1988) argue that “brag-
ging rights” accrue from winning a bet at long odds. Formally, this suggests agents maximize
expected utility, where utility is the sum of the felicity of wealth, y(·): R → R, and the fe-
licity of bragging rights or the thrill of winning, b(·): R→ R. Hence the expected utility to
a bettor with initial wealth w0 of a gamble at odds O that wins with probability p can be
expressed as: E(U(O)) = p[y(w0 +O) + b(O)] + [1− p]y(w0 − 1)
As before, bettors will accept lower returns on riskier wagers (betting on longshots)
if U ′′ > 0. This is possible if either the felicity of wealth is sufficiently convex or bragging
rights are increasing in the payoff at a sufficiently increasing rate. More to the point, revealed
preference data do not allow us to separately identify effects operating through y(·), rather
than b(·). In this sense the model of Thaler and Ziemba (1988) is observationally equivalent
to a risk-loving representative agent. A similar argument applies to Conlisk (1993) in which
the mere purchase of a bet on a longshot may confer some utility.
3.2 The Misperceptions Model
Alternatively, under the misperceptions model we postulate risk-neutral subjective expected
utility maximizers, whose subjective beliefs are given by the probability weighting function
pi(p): [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. In equilibrium, bettors must believe that the subjective rates of return to
betting on any pair of horses A and B are equal so that there are no unexploited opportunities
7
for subjective gain:
pi(pA)(OA + 1) = pi(pB)(OB + 1) = 1. (2)
Consequently, data on the odds of each horse (OA, OB) and the probabilities of the horse at
each odds winning (pA, pB) reveal the misperceptions of the representative bettor.
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The right panel of Figure 3 shows the probability weighting function pi(p) implied by the
data in Figure 1. The low rates of return to betting longshots are rationalized by bettors who
bet as though horses with tiny probabilities of winning actually have moderate probabilities
of winning. The specific shape of the declining rates of return identifies the probability
weighting function at each point.6 This function shares some of the features of the decision
weights in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and the figure shows that the
one-parameter probability weighting function in Prelec (1998) fits the data quite closely.
While the assumption of risk-neutrality may be too stark, as long as bettors gamble small
proportions of their wealth the relevant risk premia are second-order.7 Moreover, while
we have presented a very sparse model, a number of richer theories have been proposed
that also yield similar implications. For instance, Ottaviani and Sørenson (2003) show that
initial information asymmetries between bettors may lead to misperceptions of the true
probabilities of horses winning. Moreover, Henery (1985) and Williams and Paton (1997)
argue that bettors discount a constant proportion of the gambles in which they bet on a
loser, possibly due to a self-serving bias in which losers argue that conditions were atypical.
Because longshot bettors lose more often, this discount yields perceptions in which betting
on longshots seems more attractive.
5While we term the divergence between pi(p) and p misperceptions, in non-expected utility theories, pi(p)
can be interpreted as a preference over types of gambles. Under either interpretation our approach is valid,
in that we test whether gambles are motivated by nonlinear functions of wealth or probability. In (2) we
implicitly assume that pi(1) = 1, although we allow limp→1 pi(p) ≤ 1.
6There remains one minor issue: as Figure 1 shows, horses never win as often as suggested by their win
odds because of the track-take. Thus we follow the convention in the literature and adjust the odds-implied
probabilities by a factor of one minus the track take, so that they are on average unbiased; our results are
qualitatively similar whether or not we make this adjustment.
7For instance, assuming log utility, if the bettor is indifferent over betting x% of their wealth on horse A
or B, then: pi(pA) log(w+wxOA)+(1−pi(pA)) log(w−wx) = pi(pB) log(w+wxOB)+(1−pi(pB)) log(w−wx),
which under the standard approximation simplifies to: pi(pA)(OA + 1) ≈ pi(pB)(OB + 1), as in (2).
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3.3 Implications for Pricing Compound Lotteries
We now show how our two families of models—while each just-identified based on data from
win bets—yield different implications for the prices of exotic bets. As such, our approach
responds to Sauer (1998, p.2026), which calls for research that provides “equilibrium pricing
functions from well-posed models of the wagering market.”
We discuss the pricing of exactas (picking the first two horses in order) in detail. Prices
for these bets are constructed from: the bettors’ utility function, indifference conditions as
in (1) and (2), data on the perceived likelihood of the pick for first A actually winning (pA or
pi(pA), depending on the model), and conditional on A winning, the likelihood of the pick for
second B coming second (pB|A or pi(pB|A)). A bettor will be indifferent between betting on
an exacta on horses A then B in that order, paying odds of EAB/1, and not betting (which
yields no change in wealth, and hence a utility of one), if:
Risk-Love Model
(Risk-lover, Unbiased expectations)
pApB|AU(EAB) = 1
Noting p =
1
U(O)
from (1)
EAB = U
-1
(
U(OA)U(OB|A)
)
(3)
Misperceptions Model
(Biased expectations, Risk-neutral)
pi(pA)pi(pB|A)(EAB + 1) = 1
Noting pi(p) =
1
O + 1
from (2)
EAB = (OA + 1)(OB|A + 1)− 1 (4)
Thus, under the misperceptions model the odds of the exacta EAB are a simple function
of the odds of horse A winning OA, and conditional on this, on the odds of B coming second
OB|A. The preferences model is more demanding, requiring that we estimate the utility
function. The utility function is estimated from the pricing of win bets (in Figure 3), and
can be inverted to compute unbiased win probabilities from the betting odds.8
8Our econometric method imposes continuity on the utility and probability weighting functions; the data
mandate that both be strictly increasing. Together this is sufficient to ensure that pi(·) and U(·) are invertible.
As in Figure 1, we do not have sufficient data to estimate the utility of winning bets at odds greater than
200/1. This prohibits us from pricing bets whose odds are greater than 200/1, which is most binding for our
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Our empirical tests simply determine which of (3) or (4) better fit the actual prices of
exacta bets. We apply an analogous approach to the pricing of quinella and trifectas bets;
the intuition is the same, and the mathematical details are described in Appendix B.
Note that both (3) and (4) require OB|A, which is not directly observable. In Section 4
we infer the conditional probability pB|A (and hence pi(pB|A) and OB|A) from win odds by
assuming that bettors believe in conditional independence. That is, we apply the Harville
(1973) formula: pi(pB|A) =
pi(pB)
1− pi(pA) ; replacing pi(p) with p in the risk-love model. This
assumption is akin to thinking about the race for second as a “race within the race” (Sauer,
1998). While relying on the Harville formula is standard in the literature—see for instance
Asch and Quandt (1987)—in Section 5 we show that our results are robust to dropping this
assumption and estimating this conditional probability pB|A directly from the data.
3.4 Failure to Reduce Compound Lotteries
As in Prospect Theory, the frame the bettor adopts in trying to assess each gamble is a key
issue, particularly in the misperceptions model. Specifically, (4) assumes that bettors first
attempt to assess the likelihood of horse A winning pi(pA) and then assess the likelihood of B
coming second given that A is the winner pi(pB|A). An alternative frame might suggest that
bettors directly assesses the likelihood of first-and-second combinations, pi(pApB|A). Unless
the probability weighting function is a power function (pi(p) = pα), these different frames
yield different implications (Acze´l, 1966).
There is a direct analogy to the literature on the assessment of compound lotteries: does
the bettor separately assess the likelihood of winning an initial gamble (picking the winning
horse) which yields a subsequent gamble as its prize (picking the second-placed horse), or
does she consider the equivalent simple lottery (as in Samuelson (1952))? The accumulated
experimental evidence is more consistent with subjects failing to reduce compound lotteries
into simple lotteries, providing a rationale for our treatment in (4) (Camerer and Ho, 1994).9
analysis of trifecta bets.
9Additionally, note that (4) satisfies the compound independence axiom of Segal (1990).
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Alternatively, we could choose not to defend either assumption, leaving it as a matter for
empirical testing. Interestingly, if gamblers adopt a frame consistent with the reduction of
compound lotteries into their equivalent simple lottery form, this yields a pricing rule for the
misperceptions model that is equivalent to that implied by the risk love model.10 Thus, evi-
dence consistent with what we are calling the risk-love model accommodates either risk-love
by unbiased bettors, or risk-neutral but biased bettors, whose bias affects their perception
of an appropriately reduced compound lottery. By contrast, the competing misperceptions
model implies the failure to reduce compound lotteries and posits a specific form for this
failure (shown as (4)).
This discussion implies that results consistent with our risk-love model are also consistent
with a richer set of models emphasizing choices over simple gambles. These include models
based on the utility of gambling, information asymmetry or limits to arbitrage, such as Ali
(1977), Conlisk (1993), Shin (1992), Hurley and McDonough (1995), Manski (2006). Any
theory that prescribes a specific bias in a market for a simple gamble (win betting) will
yield similar implications in a related market for compound gambles if gamblers assess their
equivalent simple gamble form. By implication, rejecting the risk-love model substantially
narrows the set of plausible theories of the favorite-longshot bias.
4 Results
Figure 4 shows the pricing functions implied by the risk-love and misperception models,
respectively; the x- and y-axes show the odds on each horse, and the z-axis shows the
equilibrium exacta odds implied by each model.
Our test of the two models simply involves determining which of the pricing functions in
Figure 4 better fits the data. In Table 1 (as in Figure 4) we convert the odds into the price
10To see this, note that identical data (from Figure 1) is used to construct the utility and decision weight
functions respectively, so each is constructed to rationalize the same set of choices over simple lotteries. This
implies each model also rationalizes the same set of choices over compound lotteries if preferences in both
models obey the reduction of compound lotteries into equivalent simple lotteries.
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of a contingent contract that pays $1 if the chosen exacta wins: Price =
1
Odds+ 1
. We
test the ability of each economic model to predict this price by examining the mean absolute
error of the predictions of both models from the actual prices of exotic bets (column 1). We
further investigate which of the models produces predictions that are closer, observation-by-
observation, to the prices that are actually observed (column 3). The explanatory power of
the perceptions model is substantially greater. The misperceptions model is six percentage
points closer to the actual prices of exactas (column 2) an improvement of 20% over the
risk-love model.
Panels B and C of Table 1 repeat this analysis, but this time extending our test to see
which model can better explain the pricing of quinella and trifecta bets. The intuition is
similar in all three cases; Appendix B contains further mathematical detail. Each of these
tests across all three panels shows that the misperceptions model fits the data better than
the risk-love model.11
An immediate question is why the presence or potential entry of unbiased bettors has not
undone the price effects of bettors whose probability assessments are biased. The persistence
of the bias in this context may be due to the large track take (equivalent to a large bid-
ask spread in financial markets), which ensures that the misperceptions model yields no
exploitable profit opportunities in any of the betting pools. This is not to say that these
misperceptions are not costly: as Figure 1 shows, betting on longshots is around eleven times
more costly than betting on favorites, and this finding carries through to compound lotteries.
11We have also re-run these tests a number of other ways to test for robustness. Our conclusions are
unaltered by: whether or not we weight observations by the size of the betting pool, whether we drop
observations where the models imply very long odds, whether or not we adjust the models in the manner
described in footnote 8; and different functional forms for the price of a bet, including the natural log price
of a $1 claim, the odds, or log-odds.
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5 Robustness and Conditional Independence
Recall that we observe all of the inputs to both pricing models except OB|A, the odds of horse
B finishing second, conditional on horse A winning. In Section 4 we used the convenient
assumption of conditional independence to assess the likely odds of this bet, but there may
be good reason to doubt this assumption. For example, if a heavily favored horse does not
win a race, this may reflect the fact that it was injured during the race, which would imply
that it is very unlikely to come second. That is, the win odds may provide useful guidance on
the probability of winning, but may be a poor guide to the race for second. In this section we
test the assumption of conditional independence and derive two further tests can distinguish
between the risk-love and misperceptions models even if this assumption fails.12
We test the conditional independence assumption by asking whether we can improve
on the predictions of the Harville (1973) formula using other data. As in Section 3.3, the
Harville formula is: pB|A =
pB
(1− pA) , where pA and pB reflect the probability that horses A
and B, respectively, win the race. We estimate linear probability model where the dependent
variable is an indicator variable for whether horse B finished second. A probit specification
yields similar results.
The first specification of Table 2 shows that the Harville formula is an extremely useful
predictor of the probability of a horse finishing second. As a guide for thinking about the
explanatory power of the Harville formula, note that the R2 of specification 1 is about
four-fifths the R2 of the regression of an indicator for whether a horse won the race on its
betting odds. Columns 2 and 3 however, provide compelling evidence that we can do better
than the Harville formula. Column 2 adds dummy variables representing the odds of the
first place horse and the odds of the second placed horse (using 100 odds groupings in each
case, each grouping containing 1% of the odds distribution). Column 3 includes a full set of
interactions of these fixed effects, estimating the conditional probability non-parametrically
12Even if conditional independence fails, it is not immediately obvious that it yields errors that are corre-
lated in such as way as to drive our main results. Even so, this is an issue for empirical testing.
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from the odds of the first and second place horses; this regression is equivalent to estimating
a large table showing the proportion of horses at odds of OB/1 who won the race for second,
given the winner was at odds of OA/1. In both columns 2 and 3, F-tests show that these
fixed effects are jointly statistically significant.
We now use non-parametrically estimated probabilities as a robustness check of our
results in Table 1. That is, rather than inferring pB|A (and hence pi(pB|A) and OB|A) from
the Harville formula, we simply apply the empirical probabilities estimated using the Lowess
procedure of Cleveland, Devlin and Grosse (1988). We implement this exercise in Table
3, calculating the price of exotic bets under the risk-love and misperception models, but
adapting our earlier approach so that pB|A is derived from the data.13
The results in Table 3 are almost identical to those in Table 1. For exacta, quinella and
trifecta bets, the misperceptions model has greater explanatory power than the risk-love
model.
5.1 Relative Pricing of Exactas and Quinellas
Our final test of the two models is even more non-parametric, and relies only on the relative
pricing of exacta and quinella bets. The power of this test comes from simultaneously
considering exacta and quinella bets as both being present in the bettors choice set.14 As
before, we derive predictions from each model and test which better explains the observed
data. The advantage of focusing only on comparisons between the first two horses is that
these tests are—by construction—conditionally independent of the characteristics of all other
horses in the race. Hence the assumptions required for identification are even weaker.
To see the relevant intuition, consider the pricing of a both an exacta and a quinella
involving horses A, at odds OA/1, and B, at odds OB/1. The exacta AB (AB represents A
13Because the precision of our estimates of pB|A vary greatly, WLS weighted by the product of the squared
standard error of pB|A and pA might be appropriate. Additionally, we could estimate pB|A directly from
column 3 of Table 2. These approaches produce qualitatively identical results.
14Note that these tests are distinct from the work by authors such as Asch and Quandt (1987) and Dolbear
(1993), who test whether exacta pricing is arbitrage-linked to win pricing. Instead, we ask whether the same
model that explains pricing of win bets can jointly explain the pricing of exacta and quinella bets.
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winning and B coming second) occurs with probability pA ∗ pB|A; the BA exacta occurs with
probability pB ∗ pA|B. By definition the corresponding quinella pays off when the winning
exacta is either AB or BA and hence occurs with probability pA ∗ pB|A + pB ∗ pA|B. If horse
A is the favorite, the exacta AB is more likely than BA and hence less risky. This implies
that under the risk-love model the rate of return to exactas putting the favorite first will be
higher than that on the reverse ordering. By contrast, the misperceptions models is linear
in beliefs, implying relative payoffs to the two bet types are proportional to their perceived
occurrence. As such, under the misperceptions model there are values of A and B so that
the rate of return to exactas putting the favorite first will be lower than the reverse ordering.
Each model yields unique implications for the relative prices of the winning exacta and
quinella bets and thus unique predictions for
pApB|A
pApB|A+pBpA|B
, the probability horse A wins
given that A and B are the top two finishers. Specifically, consider the AB exacta at odds
of EAB/1, and the corresponding quinella at Q/1:
Risk-Love Model
(Risk-lover, Unbiased expectations)
Exacta: pApB|AU(EAB) = 1
pB|A =
U(OA)
U(EAB)
(5)
Quinella: [pApB|A + pBpA|B ]U(Q) = 1
pA|B = U(OB)
(
1
U(Q)
− 1
U(EAB)
)
(7)
Hence from (1), (5) and (7):
pApB|A
pBpA|B + pApB|A
=
U(Q)
U(EAB)
(9)
Misperceptions Model
(Biased expectations, Risk-neutral)
Exacta: pi(pA)pi(pB|A)(EAB + 1) = 1
pi(pB|A) =
OA + 1
EAB + 1
⇒ pB|A = pi-1
(
OA + 1
EAB + 1
)
(6)
Quinella: [pi(pA)pi(pB|A) + pi(pB)pi(pA|B)](Q+ 1) = 1
pi(pA|B) = (OB + 1)
(
1
Q+1 − 1EAB+1
)
⇒ pA|B = pi-1
(
(OB+1)(EAB−Q)
(EAB+1)(Q+1)
)
(8)
pApB|A
pApB|A + pBpA|B
=
pi-1
(
1
OA+1
)
pi-1
(
OA+1
EAB+1
)
pi-1
(
1
OA+1
)
pi-1
(
OA+1
EAB+1
)
+ pi-1
(
1
OB+1
)
pi-1
(
(OB+1)(EAB−Q)
(EAB+1)(Q+1)
) (10)
Equations (9) and (10) show that for any pair of horses at win odds OA/1 and OB/1 with
quinella odds Q/1, each model yields different implications for how frequently we expect to
observe the AB exacta winning, relative to the BA exacta. In a simple regression predicting
which of the top two horses is the winner, the misperceptions model yields a robust and
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significant positive correlation with actual outcomes (coefficient = 0.63; standard error =
0.014, n = 60, 288), while the misperceptions model is negatively correlated with outcomes
(coefficient = −0.59; standard error = 0.013, n = 60, 288).
Equations (9) and (10) also yield distinct predictions of the winning exacta even within
any set of apparently similar races (those whose first two finishers are at OA/1 and OB/1
with the quinella paying Q/1). Thus, we can include a full set of fixed effects for OA, OB, Q
and their interactions in our statistical tests of the predictions of each model.15 The residual
after differencing out these fixed effects is the predicted likelihood that A beats B, relative
to the average for all races in which a horses at odds of OA/1 and OB/1 fill the quinella at
odds Q/1. That is, for all races we compute the predictions of each model for the likelihood
that exacta AB occurs, relative to BA, and subtract the baseline OA ∗ OB ∗Q cell mean to
yield the model predictions, relative to the fixed effects. The results, summarized in Figure
5, are remarkably robust to the inclusion of these multiple fixed effects (and interactions):
the coefficient on the misperceptions model declines slightly (and insignificantly), while the
risk-love model maintains a significant but perversely negative correlation with outcomes.
It is clear that the misperceptions model does a much better job in predicting the winning
exacta, given the horses that finish in the top two positions. It should also be clear that this
test of the two theories differs from our earlier tests. Specifically, by focusing only on the
relative rankings of the first two horses, this test entirely eliminates parametric assumptions
about the race for second place.
These tests imply that while a risk-love model can be constructed to account for the
pricing of win bets, it yields inaccurate implications for the relative pricing of exacta and
quinella bets. By contrast, the perceptions-based model is consistent with the pricing of
exacta, quinella and trifecta bets, and as this subsection shows, also consistent with the
relative pricing of exacta and quinella bets. These results are robust to a range of different
approaches to testing the theories.
15Because the odds OA, OB and Q are actually continuous variables, we include fixed effects for each
percentile of the distribution of each variable (and a full set of interactions of these fixed effects).
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6 Conclusion
Employing a new dataset which is much larger than those in the existing literature, we
document stylized facts about the rates of return to betting on horses. As with other
authors, we note a substantial favorite-longshot bias. The term bias is somewhat misleading
here. That the rate of return to betting on horses at long odds is much lower than the return
to betting on favorites simply falsifies a model in which bettors maximize a function that is
linear in probabilities and linear in payoffs. Thus, the pricing of win bets can be reconciled by
a representative bettor with either a concave utility function, or a subjective utility function
employing non-linear probability weights that violate the reduction of compound lotteries.
For compactness, we referred to the former as explaining the data with risk-love, while we
refer to the latter as explaining the data with misperceptions. Neither label is particularly
accurate as each category includes a wider range of competing theories.
We show that these models can be separately identified using aggregate data by requiring
that they explain both choices over betting on different horses to win and choices over
compound bets: exactas, quinellas and trifectas. Because the underlying risk or set of
beliefs (depending on the theory) is traded in both the win and compound betting markets,
we can derive unique testable implications from both sets of theories. Our results are more
consistent with the favorite-longshot bias being driven by misperceptions rather than risk-
love. Indeed, while each model is individually quite useful for pricing compound lotteries,
the misperceptions model strongly dominates the risk-love model. This result is robust to a
range of alternative approaches to tdistinguishing between the theories.
This bias likely persists in equilibrium because misperceptions are not large enough to
generate profit opportunities for unbiased bettors. That said, the cost of this bias is also very
large, and de-biasing an individual bettor could reduce their cost of gambling substantially.
While noting that our misperceptions-based model fits the full set of bettors’ choices over
simple and compound bets, rather than stating a strong conclusion, we simply argue that our
results suggest that non-expected utility theories are a promising candidate for explaining
17
racetrack bettor behavior. This provides cause for optimism that misperceptions may also
explain anomalies in other domains of decision-making under uncertainty.
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Appendix A Data
Our dataset consists of all horse races run in North America from 1992 to 2001. The data
was generously provided to us by Axcis Inc., a subsidiary of the jockey club. The data
record performance of every horse in each of its starts, and contains the universe of officially
recorded variables having to do with the horses themselves, the tracks and race conditions.
Our concern is with the pricing of bets. Thus, our primary sample consists of the
6,403,712 observations in 865,934 races for which win odds and finishing positions are
recorded. We use these data, subject to the data cleaning restrictions below, to gener-
ate Figures 1–3 and 5. We are also interested in pricing exacta, quinella and trifectas bets
and have data on the winning payoffs in 314,977, 116,307 and 282,576 races respectively.
The prices of non-winning combinations are not recorded.
Due to the size of our dataset, whenever observations were problematic, we simply
dropped the entire race from our dataset. Specifically, if a race has more than one horse
owned by the same owner, rather than deal with coupled runners, we simply dropped the
race. Additionally, if a race had a dead heat for first, second or third place the exacta,
quinella and trifecta payouts may not be accurately recorded and so we dropped these races.
When the odds of any horse were reported as zero we dropped the race. Further if the
odds across all runners implied that the track take was less than 15% or more than 22%,
we dropped the race. After these steps, we are left with 5,606,336 valid observations on win
bets from 678,729 races and 1,485,112 observations from 206,808 races include both valid
win odds and payoffs for the winning exotic bets.
Appendix B Pricing of Compound Lotteries using Con-
ditional Independence
In the text we derived the pricing formulae for exacta bets explicitly; this appendix extends
that analysis to also include the pricing of quinella and trifecta bets. The derivations of
these pricing formulae depend on the following two formulae originally derived in Section 3:
Risk-Love Model
(Risk-lover, Unbiased expectations)
U(O) =
1
p
(B.1)
Misperceptions Model
(Biased expectations, Risk-neutral)
pi(p) =
1
O + 1
(B.2)
As in the text, we derive pricing formulae by imposing that the expected utility of all
bets is equal. Consider a horse race which includes horses A, B and C. An exacta requires
the bettor to correctly specify the first two horses, in order. A quinella is a bet on two horses
to finish first and second, but the bettor need not specify their order. A quinella bet on
horses A and B gives odds QAB. A trifecta is a bet on three horses to finish first, second and
third, and the bettor must correctly specify their order. A trifecta bet on horses A, B and
C, in that order, gives odds TABC . Thus the quinella and trifecta analogues to equations (3)
Appendicies–1
and (4) in the main text are:
Risk-Love Model
(Risk-lover, Unbiased expectations)
Quinella:
[pApB|A + pBpA|B]U(QAB) = 1
QAB = U
−1
(
U(OA)U(OB|A)U(OB)U(OA|B)
U(OA)U(OB|A)+U(OB)U(OA|B)
)
(3q)
Trifecta:
pApB|ApC|A,BU(TABC) = 1
TABC = U
-1
(
U(OA)U(OB|A)U(OC|A,B)
)
(3t)
Risk-Love Model
(Risk-lover, Unbiased expectations)
Quinella:
[pi(pA)pi(pB|A) + pi(pB)pi(pA|B)](QAB + 1) = 1
QAB =
(OA+1)(OB|A)(OB+1)(OA|B)
(OA+1)(OB|A)+(OB+1)(OA|B)
(4q)
Trifecta:
pi(pA)pi(pB|A)pi(pC|A,B)(TABC + 1) = 1
TABC = (OA+1)(OB|A+1)(OC|A,B+1)−1 (4t)
The odds data, OA, OB and OC are directly observable. The utility U(·) and probability
weighting pi(·) functions that we use are shown in Figure 3. In order to price these compound
bets we also need the conditional probabilities OB|A, OA|B and OC|A,B.
As noted in Section 3.3, we provide two approaches to recovering these unobservables.
First, we assume conditional independence, as in Harville (1973). Thus, pB|A = pB/(1− pA),
pA|B = pA/(1 − pB) and pC|A,B = pC/(1 − pA − pB). Our second approach directly estimates
pB|A, pA|B, and pC|A,B using Lowess smoothing as described in Cleveland, Devlin and Grosse
(1988). Under both the Harville and Lowess approach these probability estimates and (B.1)
and (B.2) are used to recover the relevant odds OB|A, OA|B and OC|A,B.
Colin Camerer suggested several additional analysis of our data. Although unrelated to
the analysis at hand, we include two of these suggested analyses in Figures B.1 and B.2 in
the hope that they will be useful to other scholars.
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Table 1: Mean Error Based Tests of Risk-Love versus Misperceptions Model
(1) (2) (3)
Test: Absolute Error: Absolute % Error: Which Prediction is
|Prediction− Actual| |Prediction−Actual|
Actual
Closer to Actual? (%)
Panel A: Exacta Bets (n=197,551)
Risk-Love Model 0.0139 34.3% 42.1%
Misperceptions Model 0.0125 28.0% 57.9%
Risk-Love Error − 0.00137 6.3%
Misperceptions Error (.00002) (.1%)
Panel B: Quinella Bets (n=70,169)
Risk-Love Model 0.0274 39.0% 46.0%
Misperceptions Model 0.0258 36.3% 54.0%
Risk-Love Error − 0.00155 2.7%
Misperceptions Error (.00003) (.2%)
Panel C: Trifecta Bets (n=137,756)
Risk-Love Model 0.00796 100% 28.9%
Misperceptions Model 0.00532 57.4% 71.1%
Risk-Love Error − 0.00264 42.9%
Misperceptions Error (.00001) (.2%)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Predictions and actual outcomes are measured in the price of a
contract that pays $1 if the event occurs, zero otherwise.
Tables–1
Table 2: Predicting the Conditional Probability of a Second Place Finish
Dependent Variable: Indicator for whether a horse came in second
(Conditional on not winning)
Specification: (1) (2) (3)
Prediction from Conditional Independence 0.793 0.908
(Harville Formula) (.0012) (.0077)
Odds of this horse and odds of first horse F=32.3
(100 dummy variables for each) p=0.00
Full set of interactions: (this horse ∗ first horse) F=43.5
(10,000 dummy variables) p=0.00
R2 0.0782 0.0794 0.0813
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Predictions and actual outcomes are measured in
the price of a contract that pays $1 if the event occurs, zero otherwise.
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Table 3: Robustness to Relaxing Conditional Independence Assumption
(1) (2) (3)
Test: Absolute Error: Absolute % Error: Which Prediction is
|Prediction− Actual| |Prediction−Actual|
Actual
Closer to Actual? (%)
Panel A: Exacta Bets (n=197,551)
Risk-Love Model 0.0117 33.7% 42.9%
Misperceptions Model 0.0109 24.4% 57.1%
Risk-Love Error − 0.00082 9.3%
Misperceptions Error (.00001) (.1%)
Panel B: Quinella Bets (n=70,169)
Risk-Love Model 0.0240 37.7% 48.7%
Misperceptions Model 0.0235 33.8% 51.3%
Risk-Love Error − 0.00046 3.9%
Misperceptions Error (.00002) (.2%)
Panel C: Trifecta Bets (n=137,756)
Risk-Love Model 0.00650 98.0% 30.4%
Misperceptions Model 0.00464 49.0% 69.6%
Risk-Love Error − 0.00186 49.0%
Misperceptions Error (.00001) (.1%)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Predictions and actual outcomes are measured in the price of a
contract that pays $1 if the event occurs, zero otherwise.
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Figure 1: The rate of return on win bets declines as risk increases.
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Figure 2: The favorite longshot bias has persisted for over 50 years.
Even  
Break
−20
−40
−60
−80
R
at
e 
o
f 
R
et
u
rn
 p
er
 D
o
ll
ar
 B
et
 (
%
)
1/3 1/2 Evens 2/1 5/1 10/1 20/1 50/1 100/1 200/1
Odds (Log Scale)
US: 1992−2001
Australia: 1991−2004
UK: 1994−2004
Griffith, Am. J. Psych 1949
Weitzman, JPE 1965
Harville, JASA 1973
Ali, JPE 1977
Jullien and Salanie, JPE 2000
Data Source
The Favorite−Longshot Bias
Figures–1
Figure 3: The win data is completely rationalized by both models.
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Figure 4: Predicted Exacta Pricing—Risk-Love and Misperception Models
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Figure 5: Dropping Conditional Independence
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Figure B.1: The relation between actual and perceived probability for races with different
numbers of horses.
.002
.005
.01
.02
.05
.1
.2
.5
1
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 (
L
o
g
 s
ca
le
)
.002 .005 .01 .02 .05 .1 .2 .5 1
Actual Probability (Log scale)
 
6 Horses 8 Horses
10 Horses 12 Horses
Sample: US Horse Races, 1992−2001
Assuming Risk−Neutrality
Probability Weighting Function
Notes: All lines are generated from data using Lowess smoothing.
Figure B.2: Perceived probabilities are higher for races with fewer horses.
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